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BOOK REVIEW
THE CURIOUS INCIDENT OF TIE WORKERS
IN THE BOARDROOM
EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

Washin~ton D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999. Pp. v, 362
(Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds.)
Brett H.McDonnell*
In Silver Blaze, Sherlock Holmes investigated the disappearance of
a prize horse and the killing of its trainer. At one point in the
investigation the officer in charge, Inspector Gregory, asks Holmes, "'Is
there any other point to which you would wash to draw my attention?' 2
Holmes replies, "'To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time.""'
Gregory says "'The dog did nothing in the night-time."' ' "'That was the
curious incident,' remarked Sherlock Holmes."'
On the night that the horse was taken, the dog had not barked
enough to awake two guard boys in a nearby loft. 6 From this Holmes
deduced that someone familiar to the dog must have taken the horse,
which absolved the leading suspect and helped lead to finding the true
culprit.7 This story is a nice illustration of the proposition that one must
pay attention to silence, where that silence is surprising or informative.
Students of corporate governance study how decisions are made
within corporations. Employees are a crucial part of any corporation.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. The Author gratefully
acknowledges helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Book Review from Dale Carpenter, GuyVriel Charles, David McGowan, and Paul Rubin.
1. See ARTHiR CONAN DO.aE, Silver Blaze, in THE ML~ioms OF SHERLOCK HOLMES 1, 135 (John Murray 1931) (1893).
2. Id. at 27.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See id. at 32.
7. See id
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Much of a business' success depends on how well its employees do their
jobs. Employees must be motivated, and myriad decisions must be made
as to who does what within the organization. Employees know much
about what is going on within a business, and have ideas about how
things could be done differently. Corporations differ greatly in how they
use such information. One would expect that students of corporate
governance would have focused much attention on the relationship
between corporations and their employees. One might further expect that
corporate law does much to help structure the relationship between
corporations and their employees.
One would be wrong. In economics, the theory of the firm largely
analyzes the relationship between shareholders and managers. The
relationship between the firm and its employees is usually studied in
another field, labor economics. Similarly, in legal scholarship, students
of corporate law are generally quite distinct from students of labor law.
The distinction among legal scholars mirrors the distinction between two
quite separate bodies of law.
In corporate law, employees' voices are the barks not heard. Their
absence can teach us much. But what does it teach? Reasonable minds
differ. In one view, as Holmes concludes, this dog did not bark.
Employees are relatively silent in corporate governance because there is
no reason for them to speak. Perhaps there really is something different
and special about the shareholder-manager relationship because
shareholders are the owners, the residual claimants, or the contractual
parties most vulnerable to managerial opportunism. How shareholders
can and do constrain managers to act in the best interests of shareholders
is indeed a subject deserving of separate study and laws.
An opposing view notes a possible problem in Holmes' reasoning.
Perhaps the dog barked, but the nearby boys did not hear it. After all,
they were both sound sleepers.8 One needs adequate confidence in his or
her ability to be aroused by a barking dog under the circumstances.
Perhaps corporate governance scholars have just slept through "the
barks" without realizing the significance of employees to their field.
Perhaps the tools of legal analysis and economic and financial theory,
which corporate law scholars have deployed over the last several
decades to study shareholders and managers, should be expanded to
study employees as well. Perhaps corporate law, too, should be reformed
to consider the interests of employees.

8.

See id. at 8.
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The contributors to Employees and CorporateGovernance"choose
the latter alternative, to varying degrees. They examine the role of
employees in corporate governance from a number of interesting and
valuable perspectives. Employee involvement in corporate governance
can take a variety of forms. Most obvious is the appointment of
employee representatives to the board of directors." However,
employees may be involved at other levels as well, or instead, including
helping make decisions at their particular unit-for example, through
quality circles, or through informal participatory management
techniques." Unions may also be seen as injecting a degree of employee
governance into a corporation. 2 The papers in Employees and Corporate
Governance consider a variety of alternatives. Nine of the ten papers
were originally presented at a 1996 conference at Columbia Law School
sponsored by the Sloan Project on Corporate Governance."
This Review draws four lessons and questions for future research
and debate from this book. First, a variety of factors point in opposing
directions as to the costs and benefits of various forms of employee
involvement in corporate governance.'* A greater voice in decisionmaking may improve employee motivation and hence effort, and may
also allow corporations to use many good ideas which their employees
can suggest. Employee involvement may also improve the incentive of
employees to invest in firm-specific human capital. On the other hand,
considerations of diversification, comparative competence, capital
market problems, and decision-making costs counsel against at least
some forms of employee involvement in governance. Unfortunately, this
is not the rare case of a one-handed economist for which Harry Truman
wished. Economic theory points every which way, and neither refining
that theory nor empirically testing it will give us anything close to a
clear, coherent, generally agreed upon economic theory of employee
governance.
Second, we must look to surrounding legal, economic, and social
institutions to help understand why certain kinds and degrees of
employee involvement in corporate governance exist in a given society."5
Such institutions, combined with the prevailing forms of corporate
9. EMPLOYEES AND CORPoRATE GOVERNANCE (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Re: eds.,
1999) [hereinafter ECG].

10. Seeid. at3.
11. Seeid.
12.
13.
14.
15.

See id.
See id.
See infra Part IILA.
See infra Part lLB.
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governance, constitute a complementary system which, once in place,
becomes self-reinforcing, even though in many cases the path by which
that system is established is haphazard and accidental. Comparisons
across such systems become quite difficult, and attempts to lift an idea
which works well in one system and use it in a different system should
be viewed with caution.
Third, efficiency is not all we should care about. 6 The contributors
to Employees and Corporate Governance all draw on economics, and
hence, all focus on efficiency. However, the stories they tell often show
that the agents who helped create corporate governance structures often
had many ends besides just economic efficiency in mind. A just
distribution of income and wealth and economic democracy are two
other values that are of particular relevance to this book's topic.
Economists have a comparative advantage over political philosophers
and other social scientists in analyzing efficiency, and it is truly an
important social value. However, we should not ignore other values.
Moreover, as the above two points help make clear, drawing definite
conclusions as to the Pareto superiority or inferiority of opposing
alternatives will often be next to impossible. Economists may then need
to restrict themselves to giving a rough sense as to problems likely to
arise with different arrangements and which actors are likely to gain or
lose under them. The audience can then ponder these results in the light
of their preferred normative concerns.
Finally, the book provides a good example of what is a pervasive
problem in law and economic analysis. 7 Neither economic theory nor
empirical testing provides anything close to clear answers to most policy
questions arising in this area. We should not expect this situation to
change soon, or even for quite awhile. What, then, can researchers in this
area say to policy makers? How do we as a society make policy in light
of the pervasive and probably lasting uncertainty relating to the social
effects of various alternative policies? A few suggestions are offered
below, but full disclosure must be made up front: this small Book
Review will not answer that big question.
Part I of this Review describes and examines the theoretical papers
which make up the first four chapters of Employees and Corporate
Governance. Part II looks at the more applied papers, which fill out the
rest of the book, divided into three sections: German codetermination,
Japanese corporate governance, and employee share ownership in the

16. See infra Part III.C.
17. See infra Part III.D.
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United States airline industry. Part II suggests directions for further

research and possible legal reform.
I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
A. Wy Capital(Usually) Hires Labor
Economists studying corporate governance have not totally ignored
employees. There is a relatively small, but significant, body of
theoretical literature on "labor-managed firms.""5 This literature tries to
analyze how firms owned and controlled by their own employees would
differ from firms owned by shareholders who are not employees of the
firm.'9 The literature also tries to explain why labor-managed firms are
relatively rare, and under what circumstances they are most likely to
exist.20
Gregory Dow and Louis Putterman survey this literature in the first
chapter, Why Capital (Usually) Hires Labor: An Assessment of
Proposed Explanations.2' This paper largely recapitulates earlier work
by Dow and by Putterman?. However, for those not familiar with their
work, the paper is a very good introduction to this literature.
Dow and Putterman distinguish five sets of reasons why capital
usually hires labor. The first7 stems from a major article by Armen
Alchian and Harold Demsetz.4 "[Tjeamwork is often more productive
than work by isolated individuals," but it is hard to observe effort and
contributions by individual members of a team.2- An entrepreneur solves
the problem by specializing in monitoring the employees. : ) This
18. The literature begins with Benjamin Ward, The Firm in Illyria: Markt S ndicalism. 48
An. ECON. REv. 566 (1958).

19. See id.
20. See id.
21. Gregory Dow & Louis Puttermian, lIWy Capital (Usually? Hires Labor: An Assessment of
ProposedEx-planations, in ECG, supra note 9. at 17, 17-57. Capital usually hires labor in the 'sense2
that shareholders (providers of capital) are seen as owning the firm and hiring labor, rather than
employees owning the firm and paying providers of capital a fee for their scn ice, as in a labormanaged firm. See id at 19.
22. See John P. Bonin et al., 7heoretical and Empirical Studies of Producer Cooperatives:
Will Ever the Twain Meet?, 31 J. ECON. LIT. 1290 (1993); Gregory K. Do%,. Iiy CapitalHires
Labor: A BargainingPerspective, 83 AM. ECON. RE%,. 118 11993); Louis Putterman, On Some
Recent Explanationsof 1Why CapitalHiresLabor, 22 ECoN. INQUIRY 171 (1934).
23. See Dow & Putterman, supranote 21. at 23-27.
24. See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production.Information Costs, a.d Eonomic
Organization,62 AM. ECON. REv. 777 (1972).

25. Dow & Putterman, supranote 21, at 23.
26. See id.

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:503

monitoring has the correct incentive, which is to maximize the value the
firm creates if she is the residual claimant of revenues from the firm's
activities." Dow and Putterman point out that, in theory, a variety of
alternative mechanisms are available to motivate workers in a team other
than this one.' They argue that the limited empirical evidence available
goes mostly against the Alchian and Demsetz story.29 Alchian and
Demsetz's story does not explain well the authority inherent in the
employment relation."
The second set of reasons looks to credit markets."' Employees
generally have limited wealth and hence may have trouble financing
labor-managed firms themselves, while adverse selection and moral
hazard problems limit the ability of such firms to raise funds in credit
markets.32 However, in addition to other problems with this explanation
which Dow and Putterman discuss, it is not clear why labor-managed
firms would face difficulties greater than standard entrepreneurial startups, on the arguments presented here. It is possible to make a credit
market-based argument focusing on the unfamiliarity of financial
markets with labor management as an organizational form, but Dow and
Putterman do not make that argument.33
The third reason involves risk aversion and insurance 4 Employees
already have much at stake in the success of their firm. Were they to
invest financially in that firm as well, they would become even further
exposed to firm-specific risk. Outside investors, in contrast, can reduce
risk through diversification. Dow and Putterman note, though, that
employee governance allows employees a greater role in managing the
risk that they face, and probably reduces risk caused by the threat of
layoffs.35 Also, imposing some firm-specific risk on employees is
generally optimal under standard principal-agent theory, and empirical

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See id.
See id. at 25-26.
See id.
See OLIVERE. VILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 98-100 (1996).
See Dow & Putterman, supranote 21, at 27-31.
See Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, The Democratic Firms: An Agency-Theoretic

Evaluation, in MARKETS AND DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATION, ACCOUNTABILITY AND EFFICIENCY

13, 13-39 (Samuel Bowles et al. eds., 1993); Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, The Revenge of
Homo Economicus: Contested Exchange and the Revival of PoliticalEconomy, 7 J. ECON. PERSP.

83, 85 (1993).
33. See Brett H. McDonnell, CreditMarkets, Learning,and Choice of Alternatives, in LABOR
MANAGED FIRMS AND BANKS (1994) (Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University).
34. See Dow & Putterman, supranote 21, at 31-35.
35. See id. at 33-34.
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evidence on profit sharing and agricultural contracting arrangements
does not clearly support the risk aversion explanation. ' 5
The fourth set of reasons relates to asset-specificity and investment
incentives.' Much interesting work focuses on incentives created by
different ownership structures to invest in firm-specific capital, given an
inability to completely contract as to the future use of that capital. '"
Discussion of this factor will be deferred until the discussion of
Margaret Blair's contribution, which focuses on it, except to note that
here too the theory becomes indeterminate once one notes that human
capital as well as physical capital may be firm-specific.
The final major set of reasons explored relating to why capital
usually hires labor is that labor-managed firms have higher costs in
decision-making. 9 Shareholders allegedly agree on one basic goal,
maximizing the expected stream of profit, whereas the large variety of
employees
in a firm may have a range of differing and conflicting
goals 0 Henry Hansmarn has argued this point most forcefully!' Dow
and Putterman point out, though, that there are various ways to limit this
problem, and decision-making costs appear to account for some, but far
from all, of the observed variance in employee governance."
After discussing a variety of factors which they consider less
important, Dow and Putterman conclude that in order to be able to weigh
in on policy matters, economists must refine their theory and test it
more. 3 They recognize the barriers to such work, and summarize those
barriers well: "At a theoretical level, the available hypotheses are often
fuzzy on causal details and potential interactions between factors.
Different hypotheses sometimes have parallel empirical implications. It
is not always obvious what the relevant proxy variables would be. The
required data may not exist in any convenient form."

36. See id. at 34-35.
37. See id. at 35-42.
38. This work is summarized in OLIVER HART, FmS, CoNh'mcTs, AND Ft!IV;CtLi.
STRucTURE 56-72 (1995).
39. See Dow & Putterman, supra note 21, at 42-45.
40. See id. at42.
41. See HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 44,89-119 (1996). One should
not overemphasize the lack of conflict among shareholders. Conflicts bitv-cen majority and
minority shareholders, for instance, are a well-known issue in corporate law. See generall. I F.
HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SILMIEOLDEIS:
PROTEC1ING MnoRrrY RIGHTS IN SQUEEZE-Ot)TS AND OTHER INTR/CORP'ORATE CONFUCS (2d
ed. 1985 & Supp. 1988).
42. See Dow & Putterman, supranote 21, at 43.
43. See id. at 50.

44. Id.
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Quite so. Despite these barriers, Dow and Putterman urge more
theoretical and empirical work. 5 Such work may weed out some
theoretical positions, and at any rate, it sharpens our understanding,
clarifies the connections between various institutions, and may suggest
new questions of which we have not yet thought. However, we should
recognize the likelihood that such work is likely to lead to no clear
policy implications for the foreseeable future, during the lifetime of any
life currently in existence. This Review returns to this point in Part III.
B. Firm-SpecificHuman Capital
Margaret Blair's contribution to the volume is entitled FirmSpecific Human Capitaland Theories of the Firm.6 Firms may be more
productive if their employees invest in firm-specific human capital.47 For
instance, knowledge about a firm's organizational structure and the
formal and informal roles of various employees within that structure is a
form of human capital that is of use only as long as the employee
possessing such knowledge continues to be employed at the firm. An
employee possessing such knowledge will be more productive.
However, if it is costly for an employee to invest in such firmspecific human capital, a problem arises. The firm may have an
incentive to appropriate the gain from that investment, since the
employee cannot credibly threaten to go to another firm, as his or her
firm-specific capital is of no value elsewhere. For instance, suppose the
knowledge described in the previous paragraph increases the value of an
employee's work to the firm by $10,000 per year. The firm, however,
may decide not to raise the employee's wage to reflect that fact, and the
firm's competitors would not offer a higher wage either, as that firmspecific knowledge is of no use to them. Knowing this possibility, the
employee may under-invest in such capital. If the firm and the employee
could, at low cost, write a complete contract which prevented the firm
from expropriation in all possible eventualities, the problem would
disappear. Such contracts, however, would be prohibitively expensive
and in many instances not enforceable, as a court may not be able to
verify whether a state of affairs specified in the contract in fact occurred.

45. See id.
46. Margaret M. Blair, Firm-Specific Human Capital and Theories of the Firm, in ECG,
supranote 9, at 58, 58-90.
47. See id. at 59.
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The economic literature now features a large and growing number
of articles and books attacking this issue from a variety of angles." Blair
provides a useful survey of some of that literature. She maintains that
legal scholarship on corporate governance has not yet adequately come
to grips with it.49 The firm-specific human capital problem provides a
possible argument for a larger role for employees in firm governance, or
for a fiduciary duty running in favor of employees? Such mechanisms
would help prevent firms from exploiting employee investments in firmspecific human capital.5' However, this is just one possible argument that
arises from the literature-it is not at this point a clear, agreed-upon
policy implication by any means. There are other potential solutions to
the problem. For instance, the firm, rather than the employee, could pay
for the investment. Or the firm may reward its employees for their
investment to enhance its reputation and encourage further employee
investment.
At the beginning and end of her paper, Blair makes an intriguing, if
incomplete, argument that firm-specific human capital considerations
may point to a return to the entity theory of the firm.? The entity theory
emphasizes that the corporation is a separate legal entity, not simply the
sum of its various parts.' She contrasts this with contractarian theory,
which treats the firm as a nexus of contracts between the various parties
who make up the firm.' 4 Some models within the human capital
literature suggest a role for a separate third-party as owner of a firm's
assets. "*Blair suggests the separate entity theory may make legal sense
of those models." In this paper the idea is barely more than a suggestion,
which needs much more detail and argument. It is thus not possible to
evaluate it at this point?

48. See e.g., MARGARET M. BLAIR, OwNERSmiP AND CONTROL RErH NKJNG COR.ORATE
GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWIEN'-Fmsl" CENTURY (1995); Canice Prendergast, The Role of
Promotion in Inducing Specific Human CapitalAcquisition, 10S QJ. ECON. 523 (1993); Raghuram
G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theoty of the Firm, 113 QJ. ECON. 387 (1998); Sharvin
Rosen, Implicit Contracts:A Survey, 23 J. ECON. LIT. 1144 (1985).
49. See Blair, supranote 46, at 58-59.
50. See id. at 77-80.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 59, 85-87.
53. See id. at 59.
54. See id. The leading summation of contractarian theory is FRANK H. EASTERBRcoK &
DANIEL R FiSCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCnURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991).
55. See Rajan & Zingales, supranote 48, at 422.
56. See Blair, supranote 46, at 59.
57. The suggestion is developed further in Margaret ML Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team
ProductionTheory of CorporateLaw, 85 VA. L REV. 247 (1999).
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C. PoliticalCulture
David Charny contributes a cross-national comparison of various
forms of organization in which employees have a partial, but not total,
voice in managerial decisions. 8 He focuses on one particular objection
to employee participation in decision-making: Employees as a group
may have quite heterogeneous interests, both among themselves and in
contrast to shareholders, and as a result, conflicts often arise and
decision-making becomes costly.59 Charny acknowledges the problem,
but argues that there may be a variety of ways to reduce it."
Charny situates the relationship among employees and between
employees and management within a "game-theoretic schema," though
he does no formal modeling. 6' The group of employees as a whole
contains a variety of subgroups. 62 Those subgroups may either compete
among themselves or work together to increase gains to employees as a
whole.6 Employees as a whole, in turn, may either compete or cooperate
with management.' Competition among employee subgroups may make
cooperation with management more likely, so it is not a priori clear
whether subgroup competition is good or bad for the corporation as a
whole.65
Beliefs and norms concerning corporate governance, which Charny
terms "political culture," may crucially affect the likely outcomes of
interaction between employees and management.6 Political culture may
provide focal point outcomes, deliberative procedures, and sanctions for
defections from the proposed equilibrium outcome. 6' His discussion of
these points is interesting and suggestive, but could use much more
fleshing out.6
Charny discusses three different national systems of corporate
governance. 69 Germany provides a formalized system for employee
participation in governance, Japan provides for informal representation
58. See David Chamy, Workers and Corporate Governance: The Role of Political Culture, it
ECG, supra note 9, at 91, 91-120. Sadly, Chamy recently died. See Obituaries, David A. Charny,
BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 7,2000, at B1 1.
59. See Charny, supranote 58, at 95-96.
60. See id. at 100-04.
61. See id. at 96-100.
62. See id. at 97.
63. See id. at 98.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 100.
67. See id. at 101.
68. See id. at 100-04.
69. See id. at 104-09.
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of employee interests in governance, and the United States provides for
little employee participation.70 He considers the relative ability of these
three systems to adapt to new technologies and changed economic
circumstances." He finds that the United States system provides
management greater flexibility, but at the cost of losing potentially
valuable employee input.7 He tentatively suggests that the German
system may be more adaptable and less likely to deteriorate to a regime
of no participation under current circumstances than the Japanese
system.73 Again, the discussion is suggestive, but could use further
articulation.
D. Levels of Participation
Perhaps the most valuable theoretical contribution is Tailored
Claims and Governance: The FitBetween Employees and Shareholders,
by Edward B. Rock and Michael L. Wachter.74 They focus our attention
on forms of governance other than formal participation in the boardroom
and forms of compensation other than stock ownership. 5 Rock and
Wachter argue that, properly understood, employee participation in
governance is, in fact, widespread, but at a level and in a form where it
can do the most good.76 They single out four features as determining the
optimal type of participation for a particular group within the firm:
match-specific or relationship-specific investments, asymmetric
information, risk aversion, and transaction costs."
Employees in a large public corporation frequently participate in
decisions within their work units, but not in corporation-wide policy
setting, because employees have much useful information about their
own work units, but little to add to firm-wide strategy.73 Employees
rarely receive compensation based on performance," they argue, because
of both employee risk aversion and the difficulty of measuring

70. See id.
71. Seeid. at lO-13.
72. See id. at 108, 111-12.

73. Seeid.atllO-11.
74. Edward B. Rock & Michael L Wachter, Tailored Claims and Governance: The Fit
Between Employees and Shareholders,in ECG, supra note 9, at 121, 121-59.
75. See id.

76. See id. at 124.
77. See id. at 123.
78. See id. at 124.
79. See id. at 129-30. A point which Rock and Vachter do not substantiate with empirical
evidence.
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performance." When employees do receive performance-based pay, it is
typically tied to the performance of their unit, rather than that of the
corporation as a whole.8' Investors in a public corporation, by contrast,
typically have low match-specifics' investments and hence, high turnover
in their relationships with the corporation. Therefore, investors rely
mostly on their ability to sell their shares to protect their investment (the
Wall Street rule), with some reliance on other protective mechanisms as
well.
Rock and Wachter further argue that, in closely held corporations,
investors and employees are more similar, as investors are typically less
diversified and less able to sell their shares.83 Moreover, employees
typically have a better sense of the corporation's overall strategy and
position, and each individual employee has a more appreciable effect on
overall performance." As a result, investors and employees are treated
more similarly in closely held corporations, with employees having
more input in firm-wide governance and a share in firm ownership,
typically through stock options.85
The Rock and Wachter paper provides many valuable insights and a
useful general framework. It suffers, though, from a familiar tendency to
see the task of theory as simply to explain the efficiency of existing
patterns, and of only existing United States patterns at that. They
implicitly assume that what has survived in the American marketplace
must be the most efficient outcome. However, as other papers in the
volume help explain, a number of factors may constrain the evolution of
work organization patterns. Rock and Wachter come up with persuasive
arguments for the efficiency of the patterns which they describe, but if
current United States reality was rather different, the same basic building
blocks could explain that different reality too. For instance, Rock and
Wachter argue that employees generally have few useful ideas to add to
thinking about what products to develop and market.86 Perhaps. But then
again, perhaps not. Through their involvement with the firm's
technology and with suppliers and customers, employees may gain some
very useful ideas as to product development strategy. Take, for instance,
the failure of Xerox to market the personal computer, which it helped
80.
81.
82.
at 123.
83.
84.
85.
86.

See id.
Seeid. at l31.
Rock and Wachter prefer this term to "firm-specific," but the meanings are similar. See id.
See
See
See
See

id. at
id. at
id. at
id. at

138-43.
142.
139-40.
150-5 1.
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develop. Had the senior managers of Xerox listened better to their
scientists who came up with some of the core breakthroughs in personal
computing technology, the history of Xerox might have been quite
different.' Even if in very broad strokes the Rock and Wachter picture is
correct, how much and what type of employee involvement exactly is
optimal may vary widely with circumstances and supporting institutions,
and there is no guarantee that contemporary American firms have
necessarily found the best mix.
II.

NATIONAL APPLICATIONS

The second, third, and fourth sections of Employees and Corporate
Governance examine German codetermination, Japanese corporate
governance, and employee share ownership in the United States airline
industry, respectively.
A. Gennan Codetermination
Since 1976 German law has required that large corporations
provide for formal employee involvement in corporate governance.Z
German corporations have two governing boards, rather than a single
board of directors as in the United States. ' The supervisory board
engages in general oversight, while the management board engages in
more detailed decision-making.9"' Under codetermination, large
corporations must have employee representatives on their supervisory
boards.' In the first paper included in this section, Katharina Pistor
argues that codetermination was instituted to ensure political peace
between capital and labor, with little consideration for its possible
effects on corporate governance.93 She argues that putting employees in
the boardroom increases the costs of collective decision-making for
supervisory boards, diminishing their ability to effectively monitor
management. 9' She further argues that codetermination makes German
87. See DOUGLAS K. SMrrH & ROBERT C. ALEXANDER. FiBLLNo TlE FLYTURE How
XEROX INVENTED, THEN IGNORED, THEtRSTPERsoNAL ComprEr 153-63 (1988).
88. And in some industries since 1951. See Katharina Pistor, Cedetennination: A
SociopoliticalModel with Governance Externalities,in ECG, supra note 9. at 163, 167-72.
89. See id. at 172-75.
90. See id.at 171.
91. See id.at 168, 171.
92. See id. at 165. German employees also participate in decision making at tlh shop-floor
level through workers' councils. See id. Note that this level of employee involvement in corporate
governance is more appropriate than the supervisory board level under Rock and \Vehter's theory.
93. See id. at 163-93.
94. See id. at 179.
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corporate governance into a "multiplayer game"'9 in which management
can play shareholders and employees against each other.96
Pistor admits that there is limited empirical evidence supporting her
position, although there is little evidence against it either." She notes
that in the wake of the 1976 law extending codetermination, a number of
corporations changed their bylaws to limit codetermination's impact.9
This is of interest, but it is unclear how much one can learn from this.
Perhaps it simply reflects a struggle between shareholders and
employees over the surplus corporations generate, without major
implications as to the size of that surplus.
Pistor also tries to draw conclusions from interviews with
representatives of labor unions, political parties, and legislators." These
give a sense that codetermination has led to less control of management
by shareholders, or anyone else for that matter, but again the evidence is
weak. She also makes the interesting observation that employees are
most involved in making decisions on wages and working conditions,
and much less involved in decisions concerning business strategy." This
fits well with Rock and Wachter's theory.
In this section's second paper, Mark Roe extends his project of
developing a political theory of corporate finance to Germany.'0 ' Roe
argues elsewhere that United States corporate finance institutions did not
simply evolve as the best response to the financial challenges facing
corporations. Rather, they are a path-dependent development, which to a
significant degree reflect American political distrust of concentrated
financial power. The large banks which dominate German and Japanese
corporate finance were more limited in the United States as a result102
In this contribution, Roe argues that Germany is not the first-best
optimum that all financial systems would necessarily gravitate to if only
their governments allowed it.' o Rather, a different set of political
pressures and institutional responses shaped a unique path for Germany.
Codetermination was imposed for political reasons generally unrelated
95. The phrase comes from John C. Coffee, Jr., Unstable Coalitions: Corporate Governance
As a Multi-PlayerGame, 78 GEO. L.J. 1495 (1990).
96. See Pistor, supranote 88, at 179-81.
97. See id. at 181.
98. See id. at 183-88.
99. See id. at 188-91.
100. See id. at 189.
101. See Mark J. Roe, Codetermination and German Securities Markets, in ECG, supra note 9,
at 194, 194-205.
102. See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE

103.

See id. at 170-71.

263-64 (1994).
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to corporate governance concems.' 4 Roe argues that weak German
securities markets may be a response to codetermination.1 *
Under codetermination, shareholders are skeptical of having a
strong supervisory board, as it would strengthen the power of labort"
Strong boards are palatable only if there is a large shareholder who can
counterbalance employees--diffuse shareholders, as in the standard
United States public corporation, would not be able to join together
adequately to balance labor. The alternative reaction to codetermination
is to have a weak board, so that employees' role on the board does less
to hurt the interests of shareholders." 7 A weak board, though, does not fit
well with a United States-style stock market of diffuse shareholders, as
the latter requires a strong board to counterbalance managerial
opportunism. The point is not that codetermination caused German
boards to be weak, but rather that given codetermination, it is now hard
to put stronger boards, and hence stronger securities markets, in place.
It is an interesting story. There are questions. Roe mentions other
possible mechanisms for defending shareholders from management,
including takeovers and product and capital market competition.' He
does not explain why these have not or could not be expanded in
Germany, even if boards remained weak. These factors are much more
important as relating to disciplining managers of United States
corporations than strong and independent boards have been.fO
Another question for Roe, and for Pistor as well, is how they view
corporate governance in Germany vis-a-vis the United States and other
countries. Roe's tone in this paper suggests that Germany is at a
disadvantage. However, his tone in his work on United States
institutions suggested that, if anything, the United States was at a
disadvantage. Perhaps American economic success in the 1990s made
him change his mind. Perhaps, though, he thinks that the two systems
are roughly equal in their ability to discipline managers. They simply do
so in different ways. Perhaps the best and most knowledgeable
104. See id. at 213-15.

105. See Roe, supra note 101, at 194-95, 199-202.
106.

See id. at 195.

107. See id. at 195,203-04.
108. See id at 202.
109. In the United States, boards have traditionally been largely passive and managementdominated, although this may have changed somewhat over the last decade or two. See Ira M.
Millstein & Paul W. MacAvoy, The Active Board of Directors and Performance of the Large
Publicly Traded Corporation,98 CoLi. L REv. 1283, 1285 (1998). The effectiveness of baards
with a majority of independent shareholders in enhancing corporate performance is far from proven.

See generally Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Beard
Compositionand Firm Performance,54 BUS. LAW. 921 (1999).
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comparative study of corporate governance tentatively suggests that the
German system works better than those of the United States, United
Kingdom, France, or Japan, a point at some odds with the tone of Roe
and Pistor." °
The final paper on codetermination is more empirical. Theodor

Baums and Bernd Frick perform an event study examining the effect of
court cases concerning codetermination on corporations' prices."' They
study the effect on both individual affected firms and on firms within
industrial sectors likely to be more affected by a decision. They find no

significant effects." 2 This is more or less in line with previous empirical
work, although some earlier work did find that codetermination had a
negative, though modest effect."3 The Baums and Frick paper thus
presents another challenge for Pistor and Roe.
B. Japanese CorporateGovernance
Unlike Germany, Japan does not legally require employee
involvement in corporate governance, and Japanese non-management
employees are rarely formally represented at the board level or given
large shares of stock." 4 However, many scholars have argued that large
Japanese corporations typically give a strong informal role to the

interests of their employees in corporate governance."'
Ronald J. Gilson and Mark J. Roe challenge one aspect of this
alleged feature of Japanese corporate governance." 6 They consider
lifetime employment in large corporations, a widely noted feature of

110. See JONATHAN P. CHARKHAM, KEEPING GOOD COMPANY: A STUDY OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN FIVE COUNTRIES (1994). One might argue that Germany and Japan look less
attractive relative to the United States now than they did in the 1980s or early 1990s. Perhaps, but
one should beware of letting the pendulum swing too far in that direction based on the current
success of the United States economy. There are complex tradeoffs in comparing the United States,
Japanese, and German systems, and it is not clear we can convincingly show that one is superior
overall. See FRANKLIN ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE, COMPARING FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 21-22 (2000).
111. See Theodor Baums & Bemd Frick, The Market Value of the Codetermined Firm, in
ECG, supra note 9, at 206, 206-35.
112. See id. at 225, 230.
113. Seeid. at210-15.
114. See Chamy, supra note 58, at 104, 106.
115. See, e.g., JAMEs C. ABEGGLEN & GEORGE STALK, JR., KAISHA, THE JAPANESE
CORPORATION 181-213 (1985); MASAHIKO AOKI, INFORMATION, INCENTIVES, AND BARGAINING IN
THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 150-51 (1988); Kazuo Koike, Intellectual Skill and the Role of Employees
as Constituent Members of Large Firms in Contemporary Japan, in THE FIRM AS A NEXUS OF
T'REATIES 185, 185-208 (Masahiko Aoki et al. eds., 1990).
116. See Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, The Political Economy of Japanese Lifetime
Employment, in ECG, supra note 9, at 239, 239-74.
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Japanese companies" It is frequently argued that a promise of lifetime
employment encourages employees to invest in firm-specific human
capital." Gilson and Roe disagree. They argue that the guarantee of
lifetime employment does nothing to encourage greater investment in
human capital by firms. "9 Rather, this is accomplished by the fact that
Japanese external labor markets are relatively closed.' Employees in
one firm have much difficulty in finding a comparable job elsewhere.''
Given that fact, which Gilson and Roe argue would be unacceptable to
Americans, corporations then have an incentive to invest in the human
capital of their employees.'2 That is correct, but leads to an important
empirical question: How much of Japanese investment in human capital
is borne by corporations, and how much by their employees? Gilson and
Roe have one skimpy footnote claiming that firms pay most for training
in general skills, and present no evidence whatsoever as to firm-specific
skills. ' 2' This lack of evidence is odd, given its importance to their
argument.
Gilson and Roe also argue that, as to firm-specific human capital
investment by employees, the risk employees will face is not that they
will be fired, but that the firm will lower their salaries to the competitive
level.'24 However, firms may choose to fire employees rather than lower
wages as a commitment device. If firms choose to lower wages,
claiming economic hardship, employees may not be able to tell whether
the hardship claim is accurate, and may therefore conclude that the firm
is reneging on its implicit contract. If the firm instead fires employees in
response to hardship, the firm bears a cost from losing employees with
firm-specific capital, making its decision more credible.
But, the firm and employees might both prefer a guarantee of
employment combined wvith the ability to lower wages in response to
hardship. If managers are understood to govern the corporation in the
interests of employees, then employees might trust that wage cuts are
not reneging on a promise. Analysts have indeed argued that managers
govern Japanese firms in part in the interests of employees, and are
understood to do so.'5 The lifetime employment guarantee combined
117. See id.
at240.
118. See Blair, supranote 46, at 58-90.

119. See Gilson & Roe, supranote 116, at 241.
120. See id.
121. See Id.
122.
123.
124.
125.

See id.
See id. at 242 n.1 1.
See id. at 245-46.
See sources cited supranote 115.
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with corporate governance in favor of employees might, then, encourage
employee investment in firm-specific human capital.
Gilson and Roe argue that lifetime employment originally
developed as a political response to labor strife in post-World War II
Japan. 2 6 Complementary institutions, such as the firm-bank relationship,
internal promotion, early retirement, and a closed external labor market
then evolved in conjunction with lifetime employment, giving rise to a
coherent system in which the various parts reinforce each other.' The
story thus fits with Roe's approach to corporate finance in the United
States and Germany."
In the other paper on Japan, Nobuhiro Hiwatari tells the story of
how enterprise unionism developed in post-World War II Japan.'29 Under
enterprise unionism, both blue and white-collar employees join the same
union, which is sovereign at the firm level. 3 ° How such unions
developed is of interest in its own right. The most general point of
interest to the broader themes here is that political pressure at key
historical points created different market and union structures in
different countries. After that, the countries may "follow different
trajectories because of the reinforcing effect of different surrounding
structures, even when common problems, such as the global stagflation
of the 1970s, would appear likely to compel them to converge."''
C. Employee Share Ownership
The lone paper in the fourth and final part of Employees and
Corporate Governance considers the case of the United States airlines
industry, and particularly United Air Lines ("United").' Jeffrey N.
Gordon focuses on employee ownership in firms undergoing economic
transitions."' He argues that employee stock ownership can help address
four transitional problems: just allocation of transition costs, efficient
bargaining over one-time costs, efficient bargaining over ongoing
transition costs, and the creation of superior structures for transitional

126. See Gilson & Roe, supranote 116, at 251-55.
127. See id. at 258-62.
128. See supranotes 101-09 and accompanying text.
129. See Nobuhiro Hiwatari, Employment Practices and Enterprise Unionism in Japan, in
ECG,supranote 9, at 275, 275-313.
130. See id. at 276.
131. Id. at 307.
132. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Employee Stock Ownership in Economic Transitions: The Case of
United and the Airline Industry, in ECG, supra note 9, at 317, 317-54.
133. See id.
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environments. 3 Gordon concludes that whether United will provide a
successful precedent for a new organizational form is an "open
question."'3 5 United's recent extreme problems with on-time
performance, apparently due in good part to a labor dispute with its
employee owners, seem to cast doubt on United's success.' Thus far,
there has been no good analysis of why United's pilots helped cause
such trouble for the corporation of which they owned a major part.
III. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Employees and CorporateGovernance does not definitively resolve
whether employees have been left out of corporate governance because
employees have all in all had little to add to it-they have not barkedor because those who create and study corporate governance structures
have been unable to hear what employees have to say. It is more
plausible that employees have indeed barked in the area of corporate
governance, but corporate law and scholarship have not heard them. The
range of topics the papers in Employees and Corporate Governance
cover, and the large number of insights those papers provide, support
that position. Corporate governance scholars can learn many lessons if
they follow the lead of this volume's contributors and consider the
interaction of employees with shareholders and managers. In what
remains, this Review considers four lessons or questions extracted from
this book.
A. Economic Theory and Evidence Only Get You So Far
The invasion of ideas from economics has been the great trend in
corporate law scholarship over the last two decades.'" This book is a
soldier in that triumphal army, although it often launches more or less
friendly fire on some of the work in the first wave of the attack. The
internal shell fire should come as no surprise. Despite the hopes of some
proponents of law and economics, economic theory is generally rich
enough to provide good arguments for all sides in any interesting policy
debate, and empirical economic methods are impoverished enough that

134. Seeid. at319-38.
135. See id. at 353.
136. See UAL Pilots Have Money on the Brain, Bus. Wi., Apr. 24. 2000. at 64; United
Airlines to Drop Almost 2,000 Flightsfrom OctoberSchedule, KNIGnT RIDDER TRIB. BuS. NEWS.
Aug. 9,2000, at 2000 WL 24912237.
137. See EASTERBROOK & FiscHE., supra note 54; Symposium. Contractual Freedom in
CorporateLaw, 89 COLuM. L. REv. 1395 (1989).
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they rarely give compelling reasons for choosing among those
arguments.
Some of the contributors to Employees and CorporateGovernance
provide reasons why various forms of employee participation in
corporate decision-making might enhance a corporation's productivity.
Such participation might enhance incentives to invest in firm-specific
human capital, as Blair emphasizes.'38 Employees may glean from their
work many ways to improve productivity, as Charny and Rock and
Wachter recognize.'39 Employee governance or ownership may motivate
employees to work harder or better, as Dow and Putterman point out.'40
In some circumstances, employee involvement in governance may help
induce the variety of subgroups of employees to pull together for the
good of the corporation, as Charny and Gordon argue. 4 ' Each of these
arguments, though, has counter-arguments and limits.
On the other hand,' 2 the contributors point to a variety of factors
suggesting that various forms of employee involvement in governance or
ownership may detract from productivity. Outside investors may be
justifiably reluctant to invest in corporations with employee governance
4
for a variety of reasons, as Dow and Putterman, Pistor, and Roe argue.
Risk aversion and a lack of diversification suggest major problems for
employee stock ownership, as Dow and Putterman and Rock and
Wachter point out.'" Dow and Putterman and Charny cite high decisionmaking costs caused by employee heterogeneity. 45 Employees may
simply have little of value to add to questions of broad strategy, as Rock
and Wachter argue.' 4' Each of these arguments, too, has counterarguments and limits.
Drawing conclusions given such a range of complex considerations
is no easy task. There are at least three navigational strategies. One is to
engage in ever more complicated and sophisticated theoretical work to
more fully understand the different factors and their inter-relation. Dow
and Putterman urge this approach.'47 It is certainly worth pursuing, but

138. See discussion supraPart I.B.
139. See Chany, supranote 58, at 95; Rock & Wachter, supra note 74, at 122.
140. See Dow & Putterman, supranote 21, at 23-27.
141. See Chamy, supranote 58, at 96-100; Gordon, supra note 132, at 318.
142. No one-handed economists on hand here.
143. See Dow & Putterman, supra note 21, at 31-35; Pistor, supra note 88, at 178-79; Roe,
supra note 101, at 194.
144. See Dow & Putterman, supranote 21, at 31-35; Rock & Wachter, supranote 74, at 155.
145. See Charny, supranote 58, at 95; Dow & Putterman, supranote 21, at 20-21.
146. See Rock & Wachter, supra note 74, at 125.
147. See Dow & Putterman, supranote 21, at 50.
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even relatively simple economic models often yield ambiguous results.
Models of the complexity required here are virtually certain to be highly
ambiguous in what they suggest for policy.
A second strategy is to aggessively test the various theoretical
arguments, and see which ones do the best. Dow and Putterman also
suggest this,' and Baums and Frick actually, and commendably, try to
do it.49 This approach is of course the classic Friedman positivist model,
which has guided the self-understanding of economists for decades.' It
is unsettled whether this approach ever does much good for empirical
problems that are hard and hotly contested, as ours certainly is. The
theory to be tested is complex and pliable-inconvenient empirical
results can be readily explained away in most instances. The data is
fragmentary and highly imperfect. In order to deal with these problems,
econometric methodology has had to build in too many assumptions to
reach a persuasive answer-any analyst's results are always readily
questioned by the other side. "' Continued empirical research is certainly
of value and should be commended, but it is doubtful that it will provide
us with clear answers inthe foreseeable future.
The third strategy is to look at the degree and types of employee
governance that actually exist in markets which neither require nor
forbid it, and assume that evolutionary pressures have led to the optimal
forms of corporate governance. The theoretical arguments can then be
used to explain why those forms are optimal. This is Rock and
Wachter's strategy,' 2 and a widespread one in the economics literature.
Unfortunately, we simply do not have a theory of the evolution of
corporate forms which allows us to feel confident that free markets will
necessarily give rise to a global optimum. This is particularly true if one
accepts the sorts of arguments concerning path dependence and
institutional complementarity, which are advanced in the next Section.
We are caught in a bind. If we had an adequate theory of efficient
corporate forms, we could test the theory of corporate evolution by
checking whether the efficient forms have actually evolved. If we had a
convincing theory of corporate evolution which told us that efficient
forms will develop under certain conditions, we could test our theories

148. See id. at 50.
149. See Baums & Frick, supra note 111, at 206-35.
150. See MILTON FRIEDMiAN, The Methodolop,of Positive Economics, in EssAYs, ts PosmvE
ECONOMICS 3, 3-43 (1953).

151. For a recent critique of econometrics along these lines. see Charles F. Manski, Economic
Analysis of Social Interactions,14 J. EcoN. PRSP. 115 (2000) and the works cited thirein.
152. See Rock & Wachter, supra note 74, at 121.
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about efficiency by observing which corporate forms have evolved
under the conditions guaranteeing efficient evolution. However, we lack
adequately powerful theories of either efficient corporate forms or of
corporate evolution. This bind, moreover, reinforces the extreme
difficulty of empirically testing our ideas. 3'
Thus, corporate law scholars should not expect definitive answers
from economists any time soon as to the most efficient role for
employees in corporate governance. That is not to say that the whole
enterprise of an economic analysis of these issues is futile."' Economics
can raise a whole host of fascinating questions which we might not
otherwise have thought of, and provide much insight into various ways
that law may affect those questions. The contributions to this volume
illustrate both points. Just do not expect definite answers.
B.

There Is More to CorporateGovernance than
Just the CorporationItself

How well an individual firm involves employees in corporate
governance may well depend on more than the individual characteristics
of that firm. A variety of complementary institutions may encourage or
discourage employee involvement. These institutions include, among
others, corporate and other law, the stock market, banking institutions,
the labor market, and cultural beliefs and norms. Once established, these
various institutions may reinforce each other and make it difficult for
individual firms within that system to move to a different form of
corporate governance. It may be an accident unrelated to considerations
of best corporate governance that explains why institutions initially
evolved the way they did, but given that history, it is hard to move from
a particular path once that path has been well-enough trod. To use the
jargon, corporate governance forms are part of a path-dependent system.
Chamy, Roe, Gilson and Roe, and Hiwatari all make arguments along
these lines.'
153. The point is similar to Eugene Fama's observation that in order to test the efficient
markets hypothesis, one requires an adequate theory regarding the valuation of securities, but in
order to test theories of securities valuation, one needs a theory as to the efficiency of securities
markets. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient CapitalMarkets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work,
25 J. FIN. 383, 384 (1970).
154. Or most other issues in law and economics, for that matter.
155. These sorts of arguments have become common in economics. See, e.g., AOKI, supra note
115, at 100; W. BRIAN ARTHUR, INCREASING RETURNS AND PATH DEPENDENCE IN THE ECONOMY
13-32 (1994). But see S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock.In, and
History, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205 (1995) (arguing that proponents of path dependence have not
produced any clear cases of lock-in to an inferior alternative).
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If these or similar arguments are correct, then it may be quite hard
to make efficiency comparisons across different national systems of
corporate governance. One cannot simply single out one aspect of
corporate governance and compare it across countries, as each aspect
may be tied to a host of other factors. One has to compare systems as a
whole, which is a formidable task, as the different systems vAU have
their own strengths and weaknesses in a variety of areas, and diverse
constituencies will be affected in quite varying ways in the different
systems. Making overall efficiency judgments out of such a tangle is
very possibly beyond the resources of economics. Moreover, reform
ideas drawn from one system may be hard to transplant to different
systems, as the complementary institutions which support an idea in its
original system may be absent elsewhere.
As mentioned in the previous Section, the presence of path
dependence and complementary institutions also complicate the task of
developing a theory of the evolution of forms of corporate governance.
Path-dependent systems typically exhibit multiple equilibria with
possible lock-in to inefficient equilibria.' If this story is correct, we
have no general reason to believe that corporations allowed to compete
in corporate form within a more or less free market will necessarily
develop toward a globally optimum form of corporate governance. The
difficulty of coaxing definitive results out of economic theory and
econometrics thereby becomes more extreme. Alternatively, one may
define transaction costs to mean that any observed outcome is Pareto
efficient-if it were not, bargaining would move to a superior outcome,
and the fact that such bargaining does not occur shows that there are
transaction costs preventing it, and those costs should be included in
calculating efficiency. On this approach, efficiency becomes an empty
standard.'
C. Efficiency Is Not All There Is in Life, or in
CorporateGovernance
When economists ponder normative questions, they ask what
alternative is most efficient. The contributors to Employees and
Corporate Governance are economists or legal scholars drawing on
economics. Hence, they generally focus on efficiency as the guiding
value in their inquiries. Charny briefly discusses other values, and Pistor,
156. See e.g., ARTHuR, supra note 155, at 13-32

157. See Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessnessof Pareto: Carl.ing CCase Further, 100 YALE
LJ.1211, 1215-16 (1991).
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Gilson and Roe, and Hiwatari all note that the institutions which they
consider in their papers developed for reasons other than efficiency.
However, efficiency is clearly the dominant value studied here.
Efficiency is a value worth pursuing.' Economists have a
comparative advantage over other social scientists, political
philosophers, and traditional legal scholars in discussing efficiency, so it
makes sense to pay a great deal of attention to it when analyzing in an
economic mode. However, we care about more than just efficiency. For
one, economic actors pursue other values, and their pursuit of those
values helps shape the institutions that economists and legal scholars
study. According to Pistor, Germans instituted codetermination as a way
of guaranteeing social peace between labor and capital."9 Similarly, both
Gilson and Roe and Hiwatari argue that key Japanese institutions, such
as lifetime employment and employee unions, developed as part of the
political struggle between businesses and radical unions which sought
employee control in the post-World War II years.
Moreover, efficiency is not the only value we should care about.
Economists commonly note that a fair distribution of goods is a separate
value worth pursuing, although one may often face a tradeoff between
fairness and efficiency 60 Social peace is also valuable. Many would
argue that economic democracy within companies is also of value in and
of itself.' 6' All of these values, and perhaps others as well, are relevant in
considering the desirability of employee involvement in corporate
governance.
Given these points, perhaps the goal of analysis in this area should
be to give a rough sense of which actors are likely to gain and to lose
under alternative governance arrangements, what problems are likely to
arise under the arrangements, and the net social costs of the alternatives.
Given the best guess as to the likely consequences of different
alternatives, one can then ask which alternative is best, according to the
various goals one would like to pursue. If different alternatives emerge
as best for different goals, we then face the further problem of
compromising between the various values.

158. Although some disagree. See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, Efficiency, Utility and Wealth
Maximization, in MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW 95, 95-132 (1988); Ronald M. Dworkin, Is
Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191, 194-95 (1980).
159. See Pistor, supra note 88, at 165.
160. See ARTHUR M. OKuN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF 1 (1975).
161.

See ROBERTA. DAHL, A PREFACE TO ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY (1985).
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D. What Should We Do When We Do Not Know
What to Do?
Finally, we face a problem which may be common within law and
economic analysis." Economic theory and empirical evidence do not
provide anything close to definite conclusions about the effects of
different forms of corporate governance. The forms of corporate
governance are tied to a wide variety of complementary institutions,
which makes the analysis even more difficult. Deciding what form of
corporate governance is most efficient under varying circumstances is a
tremendously difficult question to which we have no clear answers.
Adding in other social values and goals which also matter, and which
may lead to conflicting recommendations, if any of them lead to any
definite recommendations at all, makes the issue worse.
The analysis of Employees and Corporate Governance, and all
other analysis on this question, provides no definite and persuasive
answers as to what forms of corporate governance we should prefer.
This situation is not likely to change in the foreseeable future. What,
then, can we say to judges and legislators if any of them should choose
to look to scholarly analysis as an aid to policy making in this area?
What should we do when we do not know what to do?
One possibility is to make sure that laws allow for the competing
forms of corporate governance, and then let survival in the marketplace
dictate which forms come to dominate. This is essentially the
recommendation made by most contractarians who formed the initial
wave of the economic invasion into corporate law scholarship."C3
Unfortunately, if the above points are correct, we have much less reason
than the contractarians believe to be confident that the best, or at least
the most efficient, alternatives will win out in the free market. Still, if we
have no good reason to believe we can better the market, perhaps we
ought to follow Hippocrates and first do no harm. Moreover, the
presence of myriad complementary institutions will often make
governmental intervention more difficult-often, to effectively change
one element, one would need to make corresponding changes in a range
of other institutions as well.

162. Not to mention law analysis generally, and economic analysis genarally.
163. See e.g., EASTERBROOK & FIsCH., supra note 54, at 20-21. For a recent version of the
argument that in light of our pervasive ignorance the best response is not to tinker much with
markets, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace Versus Property Ln,?, 4 TEX. REV. L & POL 103
(1999).
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Another possibility is to attempt to nudge institutions in directions
which look promising, without requiring any particular alternative. Tax
breaks, subsidies, and simply providing more information about littleknown alternatives are relatively non-intrusive interventions in the
market which do not disrupt already evolved patterns, but give a push to
private actors to try out alternatives. Federal tax incentives for employee
stock ownership plans ("ESOPs") are an example of this approach,
"
although at least certain elements of that policy are troubling.
Actually requiring companies to adopt a specific form of corporate
governance, as in German codetermination, is harder to defend, unless
one has darn good reasons to explain both why it is desirable and why it
has nonetheless failed to flourish within the market. No such case has
1 65
been made for codetermination.
Even if suggestions for state intervention are limited, the
scholarship in Employees and Corporate Governance also provides a
number of suggestions for experimentation by private actors. Indeed,
employee involvement in ownership and governance is already growing,
not only through expanded use of ESOPs, but more importantly through
widespread use of stock options. One can expect, or at least hope for,
further experimentation.
At any rate, Employees and Corporate Governance should help
make clear that the silent voice of employees in corporate law and
corporate governance scholarship is problematic. Perhaps in the future
we will be able to hear this dog barking away happily.

164. See Brett McDonnell, ESOPs' Failures:FiduciaryDuties When Managers of Employee.
Owned Companies Vote to Entrench Themselves, 2000 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 199, 200, 206-09.
165. These thoughts on what should be done when we do not know what should be done are
painfully limited, and they provide little consolation. If this Author is right that the problem is
indeed pervasive, it would behoove us to think a lot more about this sort of quandary. That goes
beyond-way beyond-the point of this Review, however.

